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ConstItUtIonAL PRInCIPLes 
AnD HoRIzontAL eFFeCt: 
KÜCÜKDEVECI RevIsIteD
dagmar schiek*
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1. iNtroductioN
While German labour lawyers were still awaiting the German constitutional court’s 
inal verdict on the principles established by the Mangold case1, the court of Justice 
of the European union re-visited the question what exactly are the efects of directive 
2000/78 and the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. 
his case is interesting in at least two aspects, on which this case note will focus. First, 
the court was provoked to decide whether directives on constitutional principles such 
as non-discrimination are more prone to become efective in horizontal relationships 
than other directives. second, the court was implicitly challenged to position itself 
in the case pending before the German constitutional court, following a dutiful 
application of the Mangold principles by the Federal Labour court.
2. tHE court’s dEcisioN
2.1. tHE FActs ANd ProcEEdiNGs bEForE tHE NAtioNAL 
courts
on 4th of June 1996, seda Kücükdeveci, then aged 18, commenced employment with 
swedex GmbH & co KG, a private medium sized company, as a semi-skilled manual 
worker in the shipping department of one of its branches. by letter of 19th of december 
2006 she was dismissed with efect of 31st of January 2007, following the closure of 
* chair in Eu law, director of the centre for European Law and Legal studies (cELLs ) university of 
Leeds.
1 EcJ c-144/04 [2005] Ecr i-9981.
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the shipping department. With her claim to Mönchengladbach Labour Court2 she 
challenged this dismissal as inefective, submitting that denying her transfer to 
another department to avoid dismissal constituted ethnic discrimination, and that 
the closing down of a department constituted a collective redundancy which the 
employer had failed to notify to the regional employment agency. she also submitted 
that her notice period should have been four months, rather than only one. Her main 
claim for reinstatement failed before Regional Labour Court Düsseldorf3, leaving the 
claim relating to the notice period, on the grounds that the statutory provision applied 
by the employer in this horizontal case discriminated on grounds of age.
§622 bGb (German civil code) regulates statutory notice periods for dismissals 
of employees in Germany. under paragraph 1, the minimum notice period is four 
weeks. under the 1st sentence of paragraph 2 of this provision, the notice period 
expands progressively with increasing seniority. As far as relevant in the case, an 
employee gains a one month notice period ater 2 years of seniority, which expands 
to two months ater four and to four months ater 10 years of seniority. According to 
§622 (2) 2nd sentence bGb, any seniority gained before an employee’s 25th birthday 
is disregarded. hus, seda Kücükdeveci was deemed to have only achieved 3 years 
seniority from 1996 to 2006, leaving her with a notice period of one month rather 
than four.
2.2. tHE QuEstioNs rEFErrEd ANd tHE mAiN rEsuLts
he regional Labour court referred two questions to the court.
he irst question sought to ascertain whether a provision such as the one 
described above violates the prohibition of age discrimination, and also whether such 
prohibition derives from directive 2000/78 or a general principle of Eu law. he irst 
part of the question concerned the prima facie infringement of the prohibition, while 
the second one addressed justiication. he referring court identiied two possible 
justiications: the employer’s interest in lexibility regarding staing and the greater 
mobility of younger workers, and requested an answer on the validity of those. he 
second question turned to the procedural consequences of inding a violation of Eu 
law. As this is again a horizontal case, the referring court asked whether a provision 
violating Eu law should still be disapplied, or whether the legitimate expectation of 
the party to whose detriment this would work prevents such a result.
he court of Justice held that the prohibition of age discrimination does not derive 
from directive 2000/78, but rather from “various international instruments and from 
the constitutional traditions common to the member states” (para 20, reference to 
Mangold, para 74), conirming that the principle of non-discrimination is a general 
principle of Eu law (para 21). he court added two aspects to Mangold: it referred 
2 ArbG mGldbach 15 6 2007 – 7 ca 84/07 – juris.
3 LAG d’dorf 21 11 2007 12 sa 1311/07 LAGE § 622 bGb 2002 Nr 3.
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to Defrenne II4 and declared explicitly that directive 2000/78 only “gives speciic 
expression” to the principle of non-discrimination irrespective of age. Furthermore, 
the court stressed that the charter of Fundamental rights, which includes a 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age, is legally binding from 1st december 
2009 (para 22). he court then considered any limitations and qualiications of the 
principle expressed by directive 2000/78/Ec (para 24–42), before inding that the 
national provision contravenes Eu law (para 43 and 1st para of the ruling). in its 
answer to the second question, the court derived an Eu law obligation to disapply any 
statutory provision violating the prohibition of age discrimination, such as §622 (2) 
2nd sentence bGb. he court also airmed that a national court is under no obligation 
to refer a case to the national constitutional court or the court of Justice if it wishes to 
disapply a statutory provision contravening Eu law.
on 17th of February 2010, the düsseldorf regional labour court closed the case.5 
instead of applying §622 (2) 2nd sentence bGb, it relied on §622 (2) 1st sentence bGb 
in its conclusion that seda Kücükdeveci had accrued 10 years seniority between June 
1996 and december 2006. From the irst sentence of the same statutory provision 
the regional labour court derived that the relevant statutory notice period was four 
months. Accordingly, her dismissal only became efective on 30th of April instead of 
31st of January 2007. As the claimant had lost her main claim for reinstatement, she 
was ordered to bear 2/3rds of the costs of the proceedings.
3.  EFFEcts oF dirEctiVE 2000/78 iN HoriZoNtAL 
cAsEs
3.1. ProHibitioN oF AGE discrimiNAtioN As 
coNstitutioNAL PriNciPLE
he establishment of equal treatment irrespective of age as a general principle of 
Eu law was one of the more daring developments in Mangold case. For other non-
discrimination principles, such as the prohibition of sex discrimination, racist 
discrimination or discrimination on grounds of disability, the court could have 
relied on speciic uN conventions, to which all or most member states are signatories 
(cErd, cEdAW and cEPWd). it could also have pointed to Article 14 EcHr in 
relation to sex and race, as well as to the constitutions of most member states. by 
contrast, age discrimination is not subject of any international treaty. considering 
“constitutional traditions common to the member states” (EcJ Mangold para 74, 
Kücükdeveci para 22), only the Finnish and the Portuguese constitution contain such 
a principle.6 Accordingly, the court’s judgment in Mangold was heavily criticised for 
4 case 43/75 [1976] Ecr 455, para 54, referred to in para 21 of the Kücükdeveci case.
5 LAG d’dorf 12 sa 1311/07 (2010) Arbeit und recht 172.
6 AG Kokott opinion in AKZo c-550/07 P para 96 with footnote 78.
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deriving a principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age from such common 
traditions.7 m. schmidt had submitted that the Heads of states and Governments, 
by signing of the constitutional treaty had established the international treaty in 
favour of the general principle on which the court relied in mangold. Ater all, the 
constitutional treaty incorporated the charter of Fundamental rights whose anti-
discrimination clause (Article 21) includes age as a non-discrimination ground.8
With the coming into force of the treaty of Lisbon, there is now even less reason 
for scepticism regarding a general Eu constitutional principle of non-discrimination 
irrespective of age. With that treaty, the charter of Fundamental rights has become 
a legally binding element of Eu Law (Article 6 tEu). While the prohibition of age 
discrimination only applies directly between acts of the Eu and its member states 
(Article 51 charter), the principle of non-discrimination irrespective of age is now 
indisputably part of Eu law as a general principle. A thorough comparative analysis of 
member states’ constitutional traditions is no longer necessary to establish this.
he precise positioning of a prohibition of age discrimination among other non-
discrimination grounds is a matter worthy of a wider discussion9, which goes beyond 
the limited scope of a case note. in further considering the efects of directive 2000/78 
in a horizontal case, such as the dispute between Kücükdeveci and swedex, we can 
rely on the fact that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age is a general 
principle of Eu law, in other words a constitutional principle.
3.2. EFFEcts oF dirEctiVEs EXPrEssiNG A coNstitutioNAL 
PriNciPLE oF Eu LAW
he Kücükdeveci case is relevant well beyond the ield of non-discrimination law in 
that it concerns efects of directives more generally. it is in this ield that the court 
clariies and possibly qualiies its decision in Mangold.
he Mangold ruling had been criticised as “sibylline”10, because its indings on 
efects of the newly found constitutional principle on non-discrimination on grounds 
of age appeared as imprecise as the prophecies of the ancient Greek oracle. his lack of 
clarity has led to widely diverging readings of the case.
on the one hand, the court based its decision in Mangold on established principles. 
hese included the principle that a member state must not introduce new legislation 
counteracting the aims of a directive during its implementation period11 and the 
prohibition to apply a rule contravening Eu law, lowing from the principle of primacy 
7 see only AG mazak, opinion on the case Palacios de la Villa c-411/05 [2007] Ecr i-8531, paras 
79–100.
8 m. schmidt ‘he Principle of Non-discrimination in respect of Age: dimensions of the EcJ’s 
mangold Judgment’ 7 [2005] German Law Journal 505, at 520.
9 see Fredman & spencer (eds) Age as an Equality Issue, 2003, for example.
10 m. schmidt, as above, at 521.
11 c-129/96 Inter-Environment Wallonie [1997] Ecr i-7411.
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of Eu law. regarding the latter principle, the EcJ only referred to vertical cases in its 
Mangold judgment.12 However, it had also applied the same principle in horizontal 
cases before mangold.13 Accordingly, the view has been defended that the court was 
able to rely on cases where it had not taken recourse to any constitutional principle, 
and that it had only introduced the constitutional principle of non-discrimination 
irrespective of age as an additional argument.14
on the other hand, mangold was read as (and criticised for) introducing new 
principles, and thus enabling directives and even constitutional principles in isolation 
to have direct efects in horizontal cases. he criticism has some merit as regards the 
Inter-Environment Wallonie principle, under which national legislation introduced 
during the implementation period of a directive and counteracting the aims of that 
directive must not be applied. his principle had not been extended to horizontal 
cases before, and in so far Mangold was a novelty.15 However, with the expiry of the 
non-discrimination directives’ implementation dates this aspect of Mangold is no 
longer relevant for directive 2000/78.
As regards efects of directives, the Mangold case was read to acknowledge the 
exclusionary efect of directives in horizontal cases, without acknowledging direct 
horizontal efects of directives. Academics from diferent member states had 
defended the underlying distinction between exclusionary and substitutive efects 
of directives16, but the court had not taken recourse to it so far. According to this 
doctrine, supremacy of Eu law requires in principle acknowledging the legally 
binding character of directives. his can exclude the application of national law 
contradicting a directive. such exclusionary efects of directives are not problematic 
in horizontal cases, because only substitutive efects would imply direct efects of 
directives in such cases. Purely exclusionary efects occur when the non-application 
of a national provision contradicting the directive does not lead to a void in national 
law, because another – pre-existing – rule of national law can then be applied to the 
case. his would avoid direct application of the directive. he facts of Kücükdeveci 
ofer a good example for such a constellation: the national court applied §622 para 
2 1st sentence bGb rather than directive 2000/78. substitutive efect occurs if, for 
example, a directive has not been implemented into national law at all. if claimants in 
horizontal cases could rely on the legally binding efects of the directive in these cases, 
12 E.g. 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] Ecr 629.
13 c-473/00 Coidis [2002] Ecr i-10875, para 38.
14 schiek, 2006 industrial Law Journal 329, 335–338.
15 dashwood, ‘From Van duyn to mangold via marshall: reducing direct Efect to Absurdity?’ 9 
CYELS [2006–07], 81, at 105–6.
16 ch. Herrmann, ‘die negative unmittelbare Wirkung von richtlinien in horizontalen 
rechtsverhältnissen’ (2006) Europäische Zeitschrit für Wirtschatsrecht 69–70, Prechal, ‘Joined 
cases c-397/01 to c-403/01 bernhard Pfeifer et al’ 42 CMLRev (2005) 1445; simon, d., ‘synthèse 
générale’, Les principes communs d’une justice des États de l’Union européenne, Actes du colloque des 
4 et 5 décembre 2000, La documentation française, Paris, 2001, p. 331.
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the directive would become horizontally directly efective. Accordingly, substitutive 
efect of directives cannot be accepted in horizontal cases. he court’s Mangold 
judgment did not speciically answer the question whether the distinction between 
exclusionary and substantive efect should be endorsed.17 but it could be explained as 
using this distinction.18 other authors interpreted Mangold as introducing an entirely 
new principle of granting direct horizontal efect to directives in connection with 
general principles of Eu law.19
in Kücükdeveci, the court seems to have clariied some of this confusion, being 
more speciic and at the same time more cautious. he starting point is that the 
constitutional principle of equal treatment irrespective of age is expressed in directive 
2000/78 – which also means that it only is applied within the limits speciied by that 
directive (see paras 33–43). he referring national court did not see any scope for 
interpreting the national law in line with this principle as expressed by the directive. 
hus, in this horizontal case, the court of Justice was pressed for a statement on the 
efects of directives embodying constitutional principles, or even on the efects of 
those constitutional principles in isolation.
he court did not, in my view20, acknowledge any autonomous efect of the 
constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age itself. When the 
court used the directive to bring the case within the scope of application of Eu 
law, it also stressed that the directive expressed the principle of non-discrimination 
irrespective of age (para 27), and when it used the directive to establish the limits 
of the principle and possible justiications, the court referred to the expression of 
the general principle through the directive (para 32). Accordingly, the efects were 
ultimately derived from the “principle (…) as given expression in directive 2000/78” 
(para 51, 53). his is a rather cautious approach. he court did not acknowledge 
autonomous efect of a clause in the charter between private parties, which would 
possibly contradict Article 51 of the charter itself. Neither did it endorse direct efect 
of a general principle of Eu law. As already stated in defrenne iii21, a general principle 
of Eu law cannot become efective in horizontal cases before specifying Eu legislation 
has been adopted.
his leaves efects of directives imbued with constitutional principles in horizontal 
cases. he EcJ irst reairmed that a directive cannot “itself impose obligations on an 
individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual” (para 46 
with numerous references). his was then said not to exclude all horizontal efects of 
directives (paras 48–49). he court then considers non-discrimination on grounds 
17 m. schmidt as above, 521, masson & micheau ‘ he Werner mangold case: An Example of Legal 
militancy’ 13 European Public Law [2007] 587, at 591–593.
18 schiek, as above, with further references.
19 craig, ‘he Legal Efects of directives Policy, rules and Exceptions’ 34 European Law Review [2009] 
349, at 372, dashwood, above, 104–105.
20 difering from c rayer, in this journal (ELLJ 2010[1] 264–268).
21 case 149/77 [1978] Ecr 1365 para 27.
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of age as a general principle of Eu law as expressed in directive 2000/78. because 
this directive has been adopted in order to express the general principle, it acquires a 
heightened degree of efectiveness. his leads the court to conclude that the national 
court must not apply national legislation contravening the constitutional principle as 
expressed in the directive (para 51).
While the court’s reasoning is regrettably short, it does follow the opinion of 
AG bot. hus, it can be assumed that the court relied on those arguments when 
coming to its conclusion. AG bot irst recounted the established doctrine that 
provisions of directives cannot be relied upon directly in horizontal cases, because 
this would contradict Article 288 (2) tFEu (ex Article 249 (2) Ec), which requires for 
directives to be implemented by member states (paras 56–58). He proceeded to name 
the “palliatives” used by the court in order to maintain the legally binding efect 
of directives: an obligation to interpret national law in line with directives and the 
doctrine of state liability in cases of insuicient transposition of provisions aiming to 
grant individual rights (paras 59–63). He then stressed that the doctrine of allowing 
directives to be relied on in order to exclude contravening national provisions even in 
horizontal cases is not, as yet, well established in the court’s case law, and disputed in 
doctrine (paras 63–66). in order for the court not to contradict its former case law he 
then recommended to accept such efects of directives only in limited circumstances, 
namely where a directive expresses an overriding constitutional principle which is an 
element of the Eu legal order (paras 74–90). he AG proposed to only strengthen the 
“right to plead directive 2000/78 in proceedings between private parties” (para 89), 
and at the same time to restrict this to exclusionary efects, not allowing substitutive 
efects in horizontal cases. he court followed this advice.
Accordingly, the Kücükdeveci case conirmed some of the readings which were 
given to the mangold case, and dispersed others. he court held that directives giving 
expression to the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
would prevent national courts from applying contravening national legislation in 
horizontal cases. because the Kücükdeveci case only concerned exclusionary efects 
of directives, the court still has the opportunity to clarify whether this new doctrine 
is conined to such cases, or if directives expressing a general principle of Eu law may 
further have substitutive efects in horizontal cases.
he legal position of claimants in horizontal discrimination cases has improved 
hey will be able to dispel the application of discriminatory national legislation, if 
there is a non-discriminatory fall-back clause in national law which can be applied to 
their case. his will clearly be of relevance beyond age-discrimination. in the pending 
case Alvarez (c-104/09), the court will have the opportunity to clarify whether to 
apply the same doctrine in the ield of sex discrimination.22
22 opinion by AG Kokott of 6 may 2010, para 55.
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4. oN tHE diVisioN oF LAbour bEtWEEN NAtioNAL 
courts ANd tHE court oF JusticE
All of this will have immediate repercussions on the relation between German labour 
courts, the German constitutional court (bVerfG) and the court of Justice. hus, 
the decision also adds a further blotch of paint to the increasingly complex picture of 
the cooperative relationship between national (constitutional) courts and the court 
of Justice.
he regional Labour court’s 2nd question was asked in the context of the 
Honeywell proceedings that were pending before the German constitutional court.23 
hese proceedings result from the Federal Labour court’s faithful application of the 
mangold doctrine to another, more typical case of age discrimination in relation to 
ixed term contract. Honeywell bremsbeläge had employed an older manual worker 
on a succession of ixed term contracts, the last of which relied on the rule that there 
is no need to justify a ixed term employment contract if the employee is older than 52 
(§14 (2) tzbfG – Act on part time and ixed term employment). he Federal Labour 
court held – dutifully following Mangold – that this provision must no longer be 
applied, and that older workers were too protected by the general rule of §14 (10 tzbfG) 
which requires an objective justiication for any ixed-term employment contract.24 
consequently, the worker’s contract was held to be unlimited and subject to full 
statutory employment protection. he employer challenged this ruling before the 
German constitutional court, mainly relying on its constitutional rights to conduct 
its business (Articles 2, 12 and 14 Grundgesetz – GG [German constitution]). such 
complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the constitutional court’s 2nd senate, which 
is generally seen as more conservative than its 1st senate. he 2nd senate recently 
delivered the judgment on the treaty of Lisbon25, reairming the constitutional 
court’s competence to review actions of any of the Eu institutions for remaining 
within the Eu’s competences (paras 239–241). Prompted by voluminous reasoning26, 
the 2nd senate was expected to rule on the question whether the court of Justice acted 
“ultra vires” when delivering its Mangold judgment. it should be noted that the claim 
before the German constitutional court was based on reading Mangold as relying 
on horizontal efects of a general principle of law (craig, above under 3) and thus as 
creating horizontal efects of directives (Gerken et al, above). if, however, the court 
in Mangold relied on established case law and merely added some exclusionary efects 
of directives (schiek above under 3), the complaint was less likely to succeed. he 
23 case number 2 bvr 2661/06. he German constitutional court has published reasons for its decision 
of 6th July on 26th of August. it is available (only in German) from www.bundesverfassungsgericht.
de.
24 bAG 7 AZr 500/04 (2006) Neue Zeitschrit für Arbeitsrecht 118.
25 bVerfG 2 bvE 2/08 bVerfGE 123,126, available in English from www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.
26 Gerken, rieble, roth, stein, streinz Mangold als ausbrechender Rechtsakt, munich 2009, see also 
Herzog & Gerken Stop the European Court of Justice cEPs 2008, available from www.ceup.eu.
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majority of 6 judges who supported the constitutional court’s decision relied on the 
fact that the EcJ’s mangold judgment added a further aspect to the efects of directives 
(paragraphs 77-78), while the deviant opinion of one judge stresses that this result 
could only be achieved when relying on a general principle of non-discrimination in a 
horizontal case, which would have been ultra vires (paragraphs 108-111).
despite such high stakes, labour law academics have accepted the Mangold line 
of argument for any case of age discrimination. his has had consequences for the 
appreciation of the rule that employees starting their working life younger than 25 
will not fully proit from gradual expansion of statutory notice periods in accordance 
with seniority (§622 (2) 2nd sentence bGb). by 2007, the majority of academics had 
convened on the opinion that this provisions should no longer be applied.27 regional 
labour courts had started to disapply the provision without bothering to refer any 
question to the court.28 he constitutional court’s 1st senate’s chamber29 had even 
rejected as inadmissible a labour court’s reference under the German constitution’s 
equality clause (Article 3 GG), because most likely §622 para 2 2nd sentence bGb was 
inapplicable under Eu law.30
Against this tide, the düsseldorf regional Labour court in Kücükdeveci considered 
itself not competent to decide on the applicability of §622 para 2 2nd sentence 
bGb without a reference to the court of Justice. it also considered itself under an 
obligation to refer to the court in order to escape the obligation to refer to the German 
constitutional court. he reference to the constitutional court is the precondition 
for any German court to disapply any piece of legislation. his is the background 
for its second question to the court, seeking clariication whether a national court 
must refer a case to the national constitutional court before referring to the court of 
Justice.
he court’s answer to the second question in Kücükdeveci seems regrettably short 
in relation to all this. Without expansive deliberation, the court it rejected the idea of 
a national court, whose decisions can be appealed against, being under any obligation 
to refer (paras 51–54). it was only adamant on the national’s court obligation to 
disapply a provision contravening Eu Law, irrespective of it seeking clariication of 
the relevant Eu law by a reference. Further, the court clariied that the existence of a 
national constitutional court is of no relevance to the position under Eu law.
his answer can, nevertheless, be read as an implicit justiication of the Federal 
Labour court’s activities in the Honeywell case. considering the pending case 
27 E.g. Löwisch ‘Kündigen unter dem AGG’ (2006) Betriebsberater, 2189, Kamanabrou 
‘Europarechtskonformer schutz vor benachteiligungen bei Kündigungen’ (2007) Recht der Arbeit 
199, 206, v ‘medem Europarechtswidrigkeit des § 622 Absatz 2 bGb?’ (2009) Neue Zeitschrit für 
Arbeitsrecht 1072.
28 E.g. LAG berlin-brandenburg 7-sa 61/07 (2008) NZA-RR 17.
29 chambers of 3 judges decide on the admissibility of claims and references, while the full senate 
convenes for the substantive decision.
30 bVerfG 1 bvL 4/08 EzA § 622 bGb 2002 Nr 6.
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before the constitutional court, this could even be read as pre-empted critique of its 
suggested outcome. As has been said, there is an expectation that the constitutional 
court will hold that the court of Justice acted ultra vires with its Mangold decision. 
his will in turn lead to the assumption that any German case concerning the 
“mangold principle” will have to be referred to the constitutional court. Against this 
perspective, the court of Justice has already declared that any national court must 
remain competent to disapply Eu law even if the national constitution provides for a 
declaration of unconstitutionality by a constitutional court. However, there are also 
ways of interpreting this decision as conciliatory (see below sub 5).
Within German academia, strategies to minimize the practical impact 
of Kücükdeveci are being developed. Wackerbarth and Kreβel31 submit, that 
“disapplying” the discriminatory statutory clause regarding notice periods (§622 (2) 
2nd sentence bGb) will not allow national courts the course of action taken by the 
düsseldorf regional Labour court. in its inal decision in February 2010, this court 
ruled on the basis of the non-discriminatory part of the national legislation (§622 (2) 
1st sentence bGb) that the claimant was entitled to a four month notice period. hese 
authors consider that the düsseldorf court should have referred the case to the German 
constitutional court, asking which consequences “disapplying” of the discriminatory 
statutory clause should have. hey hope that the German constitutional court would 
have stalled the case pending before the düsseldorf court, until the legislator would 
have had amended §622 bGb. Alas, this is not in line with the court of Justice’s former 
case law in sex equality cases. court has routinely held that a violation of the equal 
pay principle must be corrected by granting the beneit withheld.32 of course, this was 
never meant to exclude future re-regulation of the issue in question, by, for example 
taking away the advantage for all workers (EcJ Smith paras 20–22). here is some 
reason to assume that the efects of the constitutional principle of equal treatment 
irrespective of age would not be radically diferent from the efects of the equal 
pay principle under Eu law. Accordingly one would assume that the court Justice 
would hold that granting the beneit withheld is the default position until a non-
discriminatory re-regulation of the matter has been achieved (a matter not clariied in 
Kücükdeveci). if any labour court follows Wackernagel’s and Kreßel’s advice, it would 
be obliged to refer the matter once again to the court of Justice.
he relation between national constitutional courts and the court of Justice has 
never been quite resolved. increasing relevance of constitutional principles in the 
court of Justice’s case law ater the treaty of Lisbon will also lead to an increase in 
potential conlicts between national constitutional courts and the court of Justice. 
he Kücükdeveci case can be read as an attempt of the court of Justice’s to reassert its 
own priority in this relation. At the same time, it also ofers a reconciliatory approach 
31 ‘das Verwerfungsmonopol des bVerfG – Überlegungen nach der Kücükdeveci Entscheidung des 
EuGH’ (2010) Europäische Zeitschrit für Wirtschatsrecht 252.
32 E.g. EcJ c-200/91 Smith [1994] Ecr i-4397 para 15.
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to the German constitutional court when deciding about the remaining conlict post 
Mangold in Germany.
5. coNcLusioN
Following Mangold, the court missed a number of opportunities for stating more 
clearly the relation of the non-discrimination directives to the Eu’s human rights 
body. Even fundamental cases such as Feryn,33 Coleman34 or Age Concern England35 
had been resolved without any reference to the fundamental rights quality of the non-
discrimination principles, partly relying on a literal interpretation of the directives. 
only in Bartsch,36 the court conirmed that there is a general principle of non-
discrimination irrespective of age, while inding that the case was outside the treaty’s 
scope of application. he court has now found a way for expanding exclusionary 
efects of directives in horizontal cases speciically for the ield of non-discrimination 
law. his airmation was delivered in relation to age discrimination – a form of 
discrimination which everyone expects to experience sooner or later. it remains to be 
seen whether the court demonstrate a similar resolve in relation to grounds such as 
alleged racial or ethnic origin, sex or disability. hese parameters remain powerful in 
stratifying European societies, because discriminatory disadvantage related to these 
is not sufered by all, but only by some. strengthening their efectiveness is bound 
to be more controversial then strengthening the efectiveness of a prohibition of age 
discrimination.
At the same time, the court has found a way to avoid another head-on conlict not 
only with its own case law, but also with the German constitutional court. by giving 
up any intention of acknowledging horizontal efects of directives generally, the court 
has also reduced the danger of its case law on directives being categorised as ultra vires 
generally. instead of relying on the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of age in isolation, the court applies the doctrine of directives being capable of having 
exclusionary efects even in horizontal cases only to such provisions of directives which 
give expression to a fundamental principle of Eu law, such as human rights. in this 
way, the court restricts the scope of application of exclusionary efects considerably. 
Finally, the court also circumvents the contested issue whether prohibiting age 
discrimination really qualiies as a tradition common to the member states. instead, 
it relies on the charter of Fundamental rights for the Eu in establishing the general 
principle of law it is relying upon. his distinguishes Mangold and Kücükdeveci. hus, 
even if a national (constitutional) court would consider the EcJ’s mangold judgment 
as ultra vires, this would not necessarily apply to Kücükdeveci.
33 EcJ c-54/07 [2008] Ecr i-5187.
34 EcJ c-303/06 [2008] Ecr i-5603.
35 c-388/07 [2009] Ecr i-1569.
36 EcJ c-427/06 [2008] Ecr i-7245.
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both these fundamental issues will ensure that the Kücükdeveci case will occupy 
generations of scholars of Eu law, hopefully becoming another milestone towards a 
coherent framework for equal treatment of persons – now derived from fundamental 
rights as established by the charter, which have only partly been expressed in a 
fragmented body of secondary Eu law.
